Party discipline in the Brazilian Legislature

Authors

  • Barry Ames

Keywords:

Brazil, legislatures, parties, presidents, discipline, roll-calls

Abstract

This paper adapts theories of legislative parties to the Brazilian case. It demonstrates that Brazilian presidents, while powerful are far from dominant. The reason lies in the nature of Brazil's legislative parties. Give Brazils electoral rules and federal structure, it ought to be a case of conditional party government, where influence flows from party members to leaders. This article puts this model to test using roll-call votes to estimate the probability that individual deputies cooperate with their parties. Two indicators of party strength are created. One indicator asseses the ability of party leaders to enforce cooperationism. The other measures the success of individual deputies in garnering local public works or controlling local job nominations. The article demonstrates that party recommendations rarely determine cooperation. It concludes that the Brazilian presidents weakness stems from the inabilty of party leaders to persuade deputies to support presidential proposals.

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How to Cite

Ames, B. (2000). Party discipline in the Brazilian Legislature. Política Y Gobierno, 7(1), 5-12. http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/433

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