Constitutional Reform in Mexico. Notes for a Future Discussion

Abstract

Since 2000, Mexican politics has changed in two important ways. First, the PRIsdefeat in the 2000 elections has ended a 70-year long one-party system. Second, the presidentno longer holds a majority in either chamber of a bicameral congress. In what is likelyto be a new era of divided government, constitutional engineers proposed a multitudeof constitutional reforms to promote good governance under a separation of powers system.While some reforms attempt to decrease the likelihood of minority presidents, others aimat strengthening the constitutional powers of the president. This paper argues that a viableand desirable strategy of constitutional change should avoid these two extremes. Instead,reforms should generate incentives to promote inter-branch cooperation duringdivided government. This paper discusses the benefits of a partial reform consisting of twoparts: 1) electoral rules that promote correspondence between the preferences of citizensand those of policy makers and 2) constitutional powers that encourage coordination betweenthe president and the congress in the process of policy making and cabinet formation.