¿Cómo consigue imperar el imperio de la ley? Imposición ed costos a través de mecanismos centralizados

Abstract

The main problem faced by the rule of law is tomake the rulers obey the law. Some authors have pointed out that in order to solve this problem the citizens have to coordinate their ations against the sovereign who disobeys the law and reach a consensus on values. Against this view, this article argues that the subjects can impose costs to the sovereign precisely bacause they act in decentralized way and because they do not share a consensus on values. Decentralized action increases the difficulties faced by the ruler to anticipate who, how and what will control him. It also multiples the costs of realizing actions that will let him survive such controls. In so fat as the decentralized mechanisms raise the costs that rulers face, the latter realize that it is in their own interest to obey the law. The resulting effecto is that decentralized imposition of costs increases the probabilities that the rule of law will become a self-sustainable institution.