A Sophisticated Model of Rational Electoral Choice: Retrospective, Issu and Strategic Voting in Mexico, 1997

Authors

  • Alejandro Poiré

Keywords:

rational choice, strategic voting, electoral coordination, elections-Mexico, conditional logit

Abstract

This article presents an expected utility framework for the study of multiparty elections and for the first time estimates the  magnitud and direction of strategic voting for a Mexican federal election. The study provides a methodology for measuring the opportunity cost of voting sincerely and shows how its use improves the predictive eficacy of the electoral choice model. Its findings challenge pleibiscitarian interpretations of Mexican elections, by clearly showing that strategic voting is not only exchanged  between the two main opposition parties, but that the PRI is also amonsgt its beneficiaries. It shows that no particular demographic characteristic is associated ti the likelyhood of voting strategically, and illustrates the expected utility calculations driving this behavior.

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How to Cite

Poiré, A. (2000). A Sophisticated Model of Rational Electoral Choice: Retrospective, Issu and Strategic Voting in Mexico, 1997. Política Y Gobierno, 7(2), 353-382. http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/416