Las comisiones y la pirámide: notas sobre la conflictiva recentralización del poder en el IFE

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Abstract

The agency charged with organizing and regulating elections in Mexico, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFS), has recently won complete autonomy from the government. At the same time, however, WE has developed a dual and ambiguous organizational structure. On the one side, there is an administrative apparatus with considerable formal powers. But on the other, the General Council constitutes the supreme authority within IFE. Through its standing committees, the General Council has managed to concentrate power, subverting the autonomy of the administrative apparatus. This paper analyzes the standing committees' structural sources of power. It describes the detailed supervision they exercise over the administrative apparatus and assesses the most important problem generated by the concentration of power on these colnmittees the marginalization of the President of the General Council. The essay concludes with some reflections on how this costly and conflictual internal dynamic might change in the future.

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Schedler, A. (1999). Las comisiones y la pirámide: notas sobre la conflictiva recentralización del poder en el IFE. Política Y Gobierno, 6(1), 187-222. http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/485

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