The Social Mechanisms of Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance
Keywords:
taxes, compliance, tax evasion, rational imitation, social mechanismsAbstract
Why the high rates of tax evasion that we observe in certain countries tend to be self-sustainable?Why people who comply with the rules tend to always do so? This paper explores thenature of tax evasion and tax compliance. The article uses data from a quasi-experimentalstudy and examines the mechanisms that explain why societies, where cheating is widespread,tend to perpetuate such equilibrium; and why societies, where conformance withnorms is high, generate virtuous circles of compliance that reap considerable benefits. The articleconcludes by identifying three of those mechanisms: the rational imitation or contagion,the effect of a social norm of retribution, and the long lasting effect of a good enforcement.
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