Why Do Parties Cheat? Institutional Choice in Mexico after Democratization
Keywords:
eletoral reforms, political parties, short-term strategiesAbstract
This paper examines Mexico’s democracy since 1996 to understand the motivations of party leaders in creating and manipulating laws that shape competition and collusion. It fnds that party leaders negotiated institutional outcomes that allowed them to cheat in the short-term and leave consequences of a non-cooperative strategy to future leaders. However, at each stage of the political game, leaders continue to follow the same strategy of non-compliance, which can ultimately lead to electoral disaster.
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