Participación partidista en elecciones no partidistas: Pruebas de las elecciones judiciales extraordinarias en México

Resumen

This study analyzes Mexico’s unprecedented direct election of judicial authorities across federal and subnational levels on June 1, 2025. Although framed as a democratization effort, the reform resulted in significant consolidation of judicial power by the ruling party. Using a combination of official section-level vote returns and original survey data, we show that turnout was higher in areas supportive of the president, while spoiled ballots were more common in opposition strongholds, suggesting that low participation reflected political dissent more than confusion or lack of information. Despite rules prohibiting campaigns and partisan affiliation of candidates, the best predictor of candidate success was appearing on a government-aligned “voter guide” (acordeón), particularly in pro-government areas. Ballot design also conveyed executive preferences and incumbency status, reinforcing partisan patterns in what was technically an election where partisanship was prohibited. Although the long-term effects of these unprecedented judicial reforms are yet to be seen, this evidence suggests that this electoral process stands to undermine judicial independence and the separation of powers.